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APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF EERs
The method of calculating EERs is necessarily determined by the availabil-
ity of data. In this appendix the sources and methods used to make the
necessary computations are described, and the detailed data underlying the
aggregate figures are presented. The order of presentation is: exports, imports,
invisibles and capital transactions.
Exports
The task of calculating EERs for export commodities was broken into two
periods: 1953 to 1960, and 1961 to 1969.' The reasons for this division are
inherent in the nature of the trade regime. Prior to 1960, a multiple ex-
change-rate system was the basic means by which incentives were accorded to
various export categories. After 1960, there was no longer a multiple ex-
change-rate system, and differentials among export categories emerged pri-
marily because of the export rebate system.
Table A-i gives the estimates of the EERs for exports between 1953 and
1960. For most major export commodities, such as tobacco and cotton,
estimates of the EERs were obtained in a straightforward manner: they were
the rates prevailing in the year in question, and were not frequently altered.
For "marginal exports," however, the situation was rather different. While
the rates were as indicated, the number of commodities to which these rates
applied varied from time to time. Thus the class of exports eligible for the
high rates both increased and decreased over time, as did the rates applicable
to them. It was not possible to obtain detailed lists of the commodities
eligible for the "marginal export rates" for the 1953-to-1958 period. When
data were available for a specific "minor" export (such as meerschaum pipes,
olive oil, etc.) these rates are presented separately. Thus while it would be this
author's judgment that textiles, for example, were subject to the marginal
export rates given in Table A-i, there is no documentation for that view.
The bottom part of Table A-i gives weighted EERs for exports for broad
commodity classes and for exports as a whole. Weights for individual com-
modities within a class were derived by taking the total 1956 value of exports
1. Estimates of EERs for 1970 and 1971 were made on a much cruder basis, due to the
absence of detailed data. They are presented in Appendix C.272 Appendix A
Table A-i



































































































Weighted export rate 2.842.892.963.153.175.877.619.00
Notes:a) From 1953 to 1957, specific premia were extended in varying amounts to
raisins and figs. These were converted to ad valorem rates by taking the esti-
mated domestic wholesale price as given in Fiat Istatistikieri 1949—1965, PUb.
No. 562, SIS (Ankara), 1968. The estimates are therefore quite rough.
b) For chrome, export retention rights of 100 per cent of f.o.b. value were
extended in 1956 and abolished in 1957. Their value was not included in the
calculation.
c) A 35 per cent premium on cotton exports was extended in the summer of
1956, removed in the fall of 1956 (when it was suspected that switch deals
were taking place) and reimposed during the 1957 export season. It is included
in the EERs for both years.
d) Retention rights of 1 to 15 per cent of f.o.b. exports, for own-use only,
were extended during 1957 to hazelnut and tobacco exports. The value of
these rights is not included in the calculations.
e) Weights are derived by taking the percentage of the respective export com-
modities of the value of the total group in 1956 exports. The value of exports
included in the group was $228.6 million, contrasted with total exports in that
year of $305 million. Omissions include livestock and feedstuffs, and a variety
of miscellaneous, generally agricultural and mineraL For marginal exports, the
EPU rate was used, since no data were available on the fraction of exports
eligible for the marginal rate going to each currency area. The minerals category
includes copper (7.5 per cent) and chrome (10.2 per cent). Traditional crop
exports include raisins (6.7 per cent), dried figs (1.6 per cent), tobacco (40.9
per cent) and hazelnuts (13.0 per cent).
Sources: Data are compiled from various sources. The most important was the Annual
Report on Exchange Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Washington),
various years. Selected price quotations were also found in the Quarterly
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of commodities for which rates were available, and then taking the fraction of
thatvalue represented by the commodity in question. Thus in 1956 copper
exports were $17.1 million and chrome exports were $23.3 million. To ob-
tain the weighted rate for mineral exports, the effective exchange rate for
copper was multiplied by 0.423 and that for chrome by 0.577. A similar
method was used to obtain the overall export EER.
Multiple exchange rates were not in use for exports during the period 1961
to 1970, and the main forms of differential incentives for exports took the
form of export rebates.2 The law enabling export rebates was passed in
Several decrees subsequently modified the operation of export re-
bates, extending and altering their coverage. The basic rate-setting mechanism
throughout the period was to grant temporary rates which would be applica-
ble until a rate was established. Once a rate was established, it could be
altered upon petition of exporting firms, and firms which had received small-
er temporary rates were entitled to collect the difference, while firms which
had received more than their permanent rate were obliged to refund the
difference.
The stated intent of allowing rebates was to offset taxes and duties paid by
exporters on their production and inputs. A question thus arises as to wheth-
er the export rebates constituted an export incentive or simply an offset to a
previously existing export disincentive. The issue is inherently muddy: (1)
insofar as rebates were a genuine repayment of taxes and duties, they con-
stituted a genuine incentive to exports only if home goods and import-
substituting producers were subject to the same taxes; (2) insofar as rebates
exceeded the amount of taxes paid they constituted a genuine differential
incentive to export regardless of whether import-substitutes and home goods
were subject to similar taxes.
The second issue is troublesome only because it is not possible to obtain
estimates of the subsidy component of rebates. The law enabling rates, and
the subsequent decrees determining them, were so worded that only actual
taxes and duties paid were to be rebated. However, (1) rebate rates were set
by inspection of the tax and duty components of costs of one or several large
firms in an industry and if other firms had a differential tax incidence, the
rebate rates could contain an element of subsidy to some firms; (2) rebate
rates were set as a percentage of the f.o.b. price, so an increase or decrease in
that price could result in a subsidy or failure to offset the taxes paid, even if
the initial rebate rate had been an exact tax offset; and (3) many Turkish
producers claimed in interviews that despite the wording of the Rebate Law
rebate rates were in fact set in a manner designed to enable a firm to cover its
2.There were, in addition, other incentives described in Chapter VII. The value of
these incentives is not included in the estimate of export EERs.
3.Law No. 261, June 27, 1963.
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costs and earn 5percent on gross export sales, independent of the actual
taxes paid.4 Whether this last was so is vigorously contested by Turkish
officials; however, inspection of the rebate rates below will suggest that there
must have been some element of the profitability calculus in the rate-setting
decision, at least for some exports.
The first issue, whether home-goods and import-substitutes' costs were
equally taxed, is the more important, and the more difficult question to
answer. Most of the rebated taxes (production tax, import and associated
duties, stamp and financial taxes) applied to all transactions, not simply to
exports. However, the incidence of these taxes could differ between firms and
between industries. On net, agricultural output was subject to less taxation
than was industrial output. Thus it could be argued that there was already a
differential incentive, in favor of agricultural exports at least. In terms of
industrial output, there is no a priori basis for believing that Turkish taxation
discriminated in any systematic way between import-substitutes, exportables
and home-goods. Hence we conclude that on balance export rebates probably
did constitute a differential incentive, both in their tax rebate component and
in any subsidy that was in fact granted. It must be remembered though that
there were undoubtedly differentials between industries. The conclusion is at
best a rough-and-ready first approximation.
Table A-2 gives the rebate rates in effect at various points for which the
data are available. No rebate rates had been set for 1964 (except the provi-
sional rates) for commodities other than textiles. By 1967 rates had been
raised on a number of items, and some new items had been accorded definite
rates. A far larger list of commodities had been accorded specific rates by
1969, of which the items listed are just a small sample. A variety of unproc-
essed agricultural products were also accorded rebates by that date. The rates
varied widely, from 9 per cent for olive oil to 49 per cent for boric acid; some
individual textile and clothing rates, not included in Table A-2, were even
higher.
Table A-3 gives the value of exports in each category eligible for rebates,
the amount of rebates actually paid, and the rebates paid as a per cent of
exports. The categories for 1964 to 1966 are not entirely comparable with
those for 1968 and 1970, and except for textiles, food products, and a few
other well-defined classes, comparisons for individual categories between pe-
riods should be made with care. The totals are comparable for both periods,
4.The law and decrees stated that rebate rates were to be determined in such a way
that taxes and duties paid were to be refunded in an amount permitting firms to
earn 5 per cent on their gross export sales. The wording of the law was that rebates
might cover less than full taxes paid although it is not so certain that this was what
happened in practice. But government officials obviously could not have worded
the law otherwise without violating GAIT rules.
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Rebate rates on representative commodities, by
price)
275
year, 1964 to 1969 (per cent of f.o.b.
1964 1967 1968 1969
Temporary rates
Agricultural commodities 0.0 5.0 — —
Manufactured commodities 10.0 15.0 — —
Negotiated rates
Textiles
Thick combed yarn 4.6 4.6 15.08 15.08
Thick carded yarn 3.2 3.2 13.48 13.48
Unbleached cotton fabrics 21—2336—4046.0046.00
Towels 18.9 24.4 34.40 34.40
Woolen yarn 10.5 20.0 33.30 33.30
Mens' nylon socks 23.5 23.0 33.00 33.00
Non-textiles
Chrome concentrate — 13.0 13.0024.81
Copper cables — 37.3 47.3047.30
Window glass — 12.9 25.67 32.11
Olive oil — — — 9.10
Tomato paste — — — 23.06
Leather products — — — 18.50
Boric acid — — — 49.29
Iron and steel — — — 28.84
Electric lamps — — — 35.43
Cement — — — 45.58
Plastic — — — 38.87
Sources: Resmi Gazete, Nos. 11712, May 26, 1964, 12713, June 30,1967, and 12887,
April 30, 1968; Yatirimlarm ye Ihracarin Tep.'zki ye Uygulama Esaslari, SPO,
1969, Pub. No. DPT773-TUD:4/.
in the sense that they include all exports subject to rebate. Some commodi-
ties ineligible for rebates in the early years became eligible at later dates,
though. Thus the coverage of the rebate system increased vastly. This is most
apparent between 1968 and 1970. In 1969, a variety of unprocessed agricul-
tural products, including cotton (10 per cent), tobacco,5 raisins (37 per cent),
and fresh fruits and vegetables (11.3 per cent) became eligible for rebates.
Whereas eligible exports accounted for 2.5 per cent of all exports in 1964,
they constituted 5.3 per cent of exports in 1967 and 29.5 per cent in 1969.
Although it would be preferable to employ the specific rebate rates actual-
5.Rebates of TL 2.8 million were reported against exports of TL 4.2 million of
tobacco. That figure is far below the value of tobacco exports, and the basis for the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ly in force in making EER estimates, some weighting system is required. Thus
in the absence of data on the value of exports in each detailed rebate catego-
ry, the percentage numbers given in Table A-3 are used in making EER esti-
mates for the 1961 -to-1969 period. Since there were undoubtedly some
minor differences in the timing of exports from the timing of rebate pay-
ments, use of the rebate rates derived from the data in Table A-3 undoubted-
ly results in some error. However, inspection of the year-to-year fluctuations
in rebates as a per cent of exports in each category suggests that with the
possible exception of the very small export categories the changes in percent-
ages from year to year conform rather closely to the general trends in rebate
rates indicated in Table A-2 -
TableA4 gives the EERs for various categories of exports for 1961 to
1969, as implied by the rebate rates, and also gives the weighted EERs for
traditional, non-traditional, and total exports, based on the rebate rates im-
Table A4




















Paper products 9.009.009.009.909.909.9013.3113.79 12.04
Glass 9.009.009.009.909.7810.2910.3110.35 11.61
Metal products 9.009.009.009.909.9011.7210.2410.81 11.90
Weighted non-traditional
export EER 9.009.009.009.629.6910.099.7210.28 10.31
Weighted export EER 9.009.009.009.049.049.069.069.099.96
.0
Note:Weights used were the value of exports of the commodity group in 1967 as a
per cent of aU exports included in the calculation. Of $522.7 million of exports
in 1967, $454.4 million were included in these groups. Traditional exports
(94.2 per cent) are slightly overweighted by this procedure.
Sources:Table A-3 and text of Appendix A.278 AppendixA Calculation of EERs
plied by Table A-3. The weights used were the value of exports in 1967 for
each export category as a per cent of the total value of exports included in
the computations. The year 1967 was employed as a base for weighting
because the commodity distribution of exports in that year was judged to be
reasonably representative of the average structure of Turkey's exports during
the 1960's. The nominal EERs given in Table A4 are those employed
throughout the text when measuring differentials in incentives between vari-
ous commodity groups.
Import EERs
The computation of EERs for imports is inherently more difficult than
that for exports. Not only were there multiple exchange rates over part of the
period, but at various times tariffs, production taxes, guarantee deposits,
stamp duties and port taxes were also imposed on the several categories of
imports. In the middle and late 1960's some categories of imported capital
goods were eligible for deferred payments or reduced schedules of duties and
other surcharges at a subsidized rate of interest.
For some components of these charges, fairly complete information is
available. For other components the data are far less adequate, and considera-
ble judgment had to be used in deriving the estimates. Before discussing the
method for estimating the EERs for import categories then, it will be useful
to discuss the nature of the problems involved and the procedures used to
analyze the various components of the IL cost of a dollar of imports.
Tariffs.Early in 1954 Turkey switched from specific to ad valorem
tariffs on virtually all imports. No effort was made to estimate the ad valorem
equivalent of tariffs prior to 1954, and hence the estimates of import EERs
start with that year. Few tariff rates were altered between 1954 and 1964,
but a major revision of the Turkish tariff structure was undertaken and ef-
fected in that year, and the set of duties imposed then remained in force with
few rate modifications.
Both the 1954 and 1964 tariff schedules were obtained for the computa-
tion of the tariff component of EERs.6 It proved impossible to trace the
changes, generally stated to be few and highly infrequent, in tariff rates
between 1954 and 1964, or after 1964. Thus while there is reason to believe
that there were very few changes, whatever changes occurred are not taken
6. 1954 tariff rates were obtained from T.C. Umum
GümrOk TarifeCerveli, Ne5riya: No. 365 (Ankara), 1956. 1964 tariff rates were
obtained from Law No. 474, Customs Tariff, 1964," from the Official Gazette,
No. 11711, May 25, 1964, as translated by Turk Argus Ajansi.
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account of in the estimation of tariff rates. It is not believed that this omis-
sion is of significance.
More important perhaps is that the tariff categories do not correspond
with the import classifications for which data are available. Thus the import
categories on which tariffs are based are much more detailed than the catego.
ries for which value of imports is reported. Thus a weighting system for tariffs
proved to be impossible.
As an alternative, it was decided to go through the 99 chapters of the
tariff code, selecting items from each chapter containing commodities which
Turkey imports. The basis of selection was primarily the author's judgment as
to the relative importance and representativeness of the individual items.
Some chapters cover a much higher value of imports than others, and more
items were included from those chapters than from others.
The tariff rates for the selected items were then collected from the 1954
and 1964 tariff schedule. Each specific commodity category was then, some-
what arbitrarily, assigned to one of four groups: consumer goods; producers'
raw materials and intermediate goods; capital goods; and imports with domes-
tic substitutes. The last category cuts across the other three, but was deemed
useful to indicate the height of protection accorded to domestically produced
import-competing goods.
An unweighted average of the individual rates for each group was taken as
representative of the functional grouping. Table A-S lists the specific com-
modity categories selected in the sample, gives the tariff rates applicable to
them from the 1954 to 1964 tariffs, and indicates the commodity class to
which the item was assigned. Names of the commodity groups have generally
been considerably shortened, with the name adopted being designed to pro-
vide an idea of the contents of the group. As can be seen, the allocation of
items to the four categories is of necessity rather arbitrary: some items desig-
nated consumer goods are clearly also imports with domestic substitutes, and
there are many cases where an item has more than one category of end-use
(e.g. locks).
Altogether, ill commodities were selected for the sample: there are 37
items designated consumer goods, 47 producers' intermediates and raw mate-
rials, 13 import-substitutes, and 14 capital goods.
Every effort was made to make the sample as representative as possible,
and inspection of other categories does not suggest any obvious bias in the
sample. It must be recalled that the absence of any meaningful quantity
weights somewhat biases the resulting tariff averages, although the direction
and magnitude of the bias is unknown. The tariff rates given in Table A-S are
those used for estimating EERs and are employed, by category, to get esti-
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Sample of import commodities chosen, 1954 and 1964 tariff rates, and commodity class
to which assigned
BTN Code and Name
40.01 Natural rubber
40.11 Rubber tires
46.02 Woven plaiting materials
47.01 Paper pulp




BTNCode and Name Class
1954 1964
5.10Ivory CG 10 20
7.06Root and tuber vegetables CG 50 25
8.01Tropical fruit CG 100 75
9.01Coffee unroasted CG 75 75
Coffee roasted CG 100 100
9.02Tea CG 75 100
9.04Pepper CG 100 100
10.01Wheat CG 50 15
13.01Dyeing raw materials RM 100 100
15.12Hydrogenated fats and oils RM 60 60
17.01Beetandsugarcane CG 100 150
18.01Cocoa beans RM 10 50
19.03Macaroni and pastas CG 50 50
20.05Jams CC 150 75
21.05Soups CG 100 75
22.03Beer CG 150 100
23.04Oil cakes RM 15 15
25.03Sulphur RM 20 75
25.19Magnesium carbonate RM 25 25
25.24Asbestos RM 25 15
26.01Metallic ores RM 5 5
27.01Coal RM 10 60
28.04Hydrogen RM 50 50
28.06Hydrochloric acid RM 15 40
28.09Nitric acid RM 5 40
28.19Zinc oxide RM 10 20
28.26Tin oxides RM 15 15
28.39Nitrates and nitrites RM 5 20—25
29.06Phenols RM 25 25
29.14Monoacids RM 100 50
29.38Vitamins CG 5 5
31.02Nitrogenous fertilizers CC 35 35
32.03Synthetic tanning materials RM 25 40
24.01Soap CG 100 50—60
35.02Albumin RM 30 30
36.03Blasting fuses RM 50 100
37.02Photographic film CG 35 35
38.05Tall oil RM 15 35
39.02Polymerization products RM 50 50
io.os Common plate glass
71.12 Jewelry
73.07 Forged iron andsteel pr
73.14 Iron and steelwire
73.26 Barbed wire









































Calculation of EERs 281
Table A-S (continued)
BTNCode and Name Class
Tariff Rate
1954 1964
40.01Natural rubber RM 50 40
40.11Rubber tires MS 30 40
41.02Tanned leather RM 45 90
42.02Leather travel goods CG 100 150
43.03Articles of furskin CG 100 200
44.15Plywood RM 40 50
45.03Natural cork articles RM 35 50
46.02Woven plaiting materials RM 40 50
47.01Paper pulp RM 5 15
48.05Corrugated paper, paperboard MS 60 60
48.16Packing containers RM 100 75
50.04Silk yarn RM 40 40
51.04Woven fabrics, man-made fiber MS 100 150
53.11Woven fabrics of wool MS 80 100
54.01Raw flax RM 20 20
55.04Carded and combed cotton RM 20 20
55.06Cotton yarn MS 60 60
56.04Man-made discontinuous fibers MS 50—75 30
56.06Yarns of man-made fibers MS 100 100
57.03Unspun jute RM 5 5
58.05Narrow woven fabrics MS 100 100
60.01Knitted fabric MS 100 100
61.02Womens' outer wear CG 150 100
62.02Linen (bed, table, etc.) CG 100 100
64.05Footwear CG 100 100
65.05Hats and headgear CG 70 70
66.01UmbrelLas CG 100 100
67.04Wigs CG 100 100
68.13Asbestos articles RM 25 75
69.02Refractory bricks RM 40 40
69.05Rooting tiles MS 75 50
69.10Sinks, wash basins CG 100 100
70.05Common plate glass MS 50 50
71.12Jewelry CG 20 20
73.07Forged iron and steel products RM 15 15
73.14Iron and steel wire RM 15 30




BTNode and Name Class
Tariff Rate
1954 1964
73.32Bolts and nuts MS 35 50
74.07Copper tubes and pipes RM 10 40
74.17Copper cooking and heating items CG 40 50
75.03Nickel plate RM 20 25
76.08Aluminum structures KG 15 50
77.02Magnesium rods, bars, etc. RM 5 5
78.04Lead foil and strip RM 40 40
79.05Zinc roofing material RM 30 50
80.03Tin plate, sheet, strip RM 5 10
82.02Saws RM 25 50
83.01Locks CG 50 75
84.06Internal combustion engine KG 5 35
84.15Regrigeration equipment KG 10 60
84.22Lifting, loading machinery KG 5—10 50
84.31Paper-making machinery KG 5 30
84.37Textile machinery KG 5 35—40
84.45Metal working machine tools KG S 50
84.63Vehicle parts KG 5 30
85.20Electric filament lamps CG 50 50
85.25Insulators RM 35 50
86.06Railway rolling stock KG 10 30
87.01Tractors KG 25 30
87.02Busesand autos KG 40 60—76
88.02Airplanes KG 5 0—5
89.01Ships KG 50 50
90.07Photo cameras CG 30 60
90.17Medical instruments RM 15 35
90.27Meters KG 25 50
91.01Watches CG 25 75
92.01Pianos CG 15 50
94.03Furniture and parts CG 80 100
96.05Cosmetic articles CG 100 100
97.02Dolls CG 100 100
98.03Fountain pens CG 60 75
98.08Typewriter ribbons CG 40 75
Note:Abbreviations for class are: CG, consumer goods; KG, capital goods; RM, raw
materials and intermediate producers' goods; MS, imports with domestic sub-
stitutes.
Sources:T.C. Balvelaket, "Istatistik Umum GümrQk Girig Tarife Cetveli,
Nqriyat No. 365 (Ankara) 1956; and Law No. 474, Import Customs Tariff,
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Municipalitytax.Municipality taxes have been levied against imports
throughout the period under consideration. The municipality tax has been
constant, at 15 per cent of the customs duty charged against imports. Thus an
import subject to a 50 per cent tariff was also subject to a municipality tax
equal to 7½ per cent of the c.i.f. price.
Wharf tax.A wharf tax is, and has been, levied upon the sum of c.i.f.
price, tariff, municipality tax, and other costs of landing goods (opening a
letter of credit, stamps, storage charges, etc.). The rate of tax was 2½ per cent
of the sum of all previously noted costs until 1966 and has been 5 per cent
since that time. Thus for a commodity with miscellaneous costs equal to 10
per cent of c.i.f. price, a commonly accepted estimate, the wharf tax would
be:
WT=W{Pf (1.10+ 1.15 t)]
where WT is the wharf tax levied, w is the rate of wharf tax, Pf is the c.i.f.
price of the good, and t the tariff rate. Despite the low nominal rate of the
wharf duty, it generally exceeded the municipality tax, because of its much
larger base. With a tariff rate of 20 per cent, for example, the municipality
tax was equal to 3 per cent of the c.i.f. price, and the wharf tax equal (with
the estimate of 10 per cent of c.i.f. price for miscellaneous charges) to 3.3 per
cent at aper cent rate and 6.6 per cent at the 5 per cent rate of c.i.f. price.
In computing effective exchange rates for imports, no attempt was made to
estimate the magnitude of other landing costs. Its magnitude cannot be more
than 0.25 per cent prior to 1966 and 0.5 per cent of the basic exchange rate
thereafter. This omission does not affect the relative EERs between different
import categories, but does result in a slight understatement of the differen-
tial between import and export EERs.
Production tax. A major source of revenue in Turkey is the lstihsal
Vergisi, generally referred to as the production tax (sometimes called ex-
penditure tax). It is levied both on imported goods (on the basis of landed
cost, including all previously indicated charges) and on domestic output. The
production tax is levied against four basic lists:
(I) Primary Products. Imports and domestically produced raw materials
(many of which are really intermediate goods) are subject to the same
rate of tax, on landed cost and producers' sale price, respectively.
(II) Some Finished Products. For commodities on List II, the rate of tax,
on the same basis as for List I, is the same for imports and domestically
produced products.
(III) Coffee, Cocoa, Beverages and Glucose. Imported and domestically
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List I —PrimaryProducts
Cement, bricks, and other heat materials
Iron products (rails, bars, wires, etc.)
Iron and steel (pig iron and steel ingots)
Copper (ingots, bars, sheets, strips, profiles, etc.)
Other metals or minerals including sulfur
Petroleum products
Flash point below 30°C
Flash point 30°—55°C
Flash point over 55°C
for 80% refined before cracking




















Electricity (domestic and hotels excluded)
Gas
Miscellaneous tariff nos.
05.14, 13.02, 27.12, 27.13








TL 450 per ton
TL 240 per ton
IL 230 per ton
TL 230 per ton
IL 50 per ton














IL 0.01 per kwh

















Photographic equipment and film
Ceramic products
China products
List III —Coffee,Cocoa, Beverai
Coffee
Cocoa and cocoa products







Products from cement or other 1
Metal products









Jute, sisal and manila prodw
Others in List I
Fur products
Products made from hornsand




Source:Data supplied by Pr
Table A-6
Production tax lists and schedules in effect, 1964
Ammunition, explosives and arms 25%
Matches IL 0.60 per 1,000
Vehicles
Bicycles (except childrens') 20%
Motorcycles 20%
Trucks (small) 25%
Passenger cars 25%Appendix A
J Calculationof EERs 285
Coffee TL 5 per kg
Cocoa and cocoa products 30%
Beverages not produced by the Monopoly Administration
Beer IL 0.4 per liter
Champagne TL 15 per liter
Other wine TL 0.2 per liter
Whiskey IL 30 per liter
Glucose TL 0.5 per kg.
List IV —ImportedProducts
Products from cement or other heat resisting materials 10%
Metal products
Machines (to be established) 10%
Other machines 18%
Bicycles (childrens' only) 15%






Jute, sisal and manila products 12.5%
Others in List 1 18%
Fur products 60%
Products made from horns and bones 60%
Products from precious stones 60%
Coffee products 25%
Cocoa products 25%










Radios. record players. etc.

























TL 450 per ton
TL 240 per ton
TL 230 per ton
IL 230 per ton
TL 50 per ton














IL 0.01 per kwh










Source:Data supplied by Professor Wayne Snyder.calculation of EERs
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(IV) Imported Products. Only imported products on this list are subject to
tax, on the basis of the landed cost (c.i.f. price, tariff, municipality tax,
miscellaneous costs, plus wharf duty).
The production tax for Lists I to III is levied at the same rate on imports and
domestically produced goods in the same category. But elements of extra
protection against imports nonetheless exist. Since the tax is levied upon
landed cost, the tariff and other import taxes are in fact cascaded. And some
Table A-i
































































































































Notes:a) Value of domestic production is given by the Ministry of Finance.
b) Not all imports are dutiable. NATO infrastructure, PL 480, and a variety of
other miscellaneous categories are exempt from duty. However, figures on the
amount of dutiable imports are not available for the entire period, so total im-
ports were used for these computations.
Sources:1952—1964 Ministry of Finance, General Directorate of Revenues, Budget
Revenues Bulletin No. 14, Fiscal Year 1964, p. 124 (cols 1, 4, and 6), p. 130
(cols 2, 3, 5, and 7), 1965 to 1970. Tax receipts from Social andEconomic
Indicators, AID, 1971.Appendix A
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items on Lists I to 111 are almost exclusivelyimports and are thus taxed at
rates above those applying to most domesticproducts.
There is no discrimination against imports, evenfor items on List IV,
except insofar as the above considerationshold, or as the rates applicable to
imports are above the average rate charged againstdomestic production, or if
the commodity is domestically produced. Thus if an item onList IV were
taxed at the average rate of all domestic products andthere were no domestic
production, the only discriminatory effect of the production taxwould be
the cascading of the tariff.
In addition to the conceptual difficulties justmentioned, production tax
rates were revised substantially in 1956, 1963,and 1964, and only the lists
and rates applicable for 1962 and 1964 are available(although the lists have
not since been significantlyaltered).7
Table A-6 gives the lists applicable since1964.8 Table A-? gives data
collections from the import productiontax, domestic production tax,
customs duties, and comparable value-addedfigures for the period 1952 to
1969. As can be seen, the import production tax has yielded revenue overthe
years about equal to that from customsduties. Until 1964, moreover, import
production tax revenues were generally slightly in excessof the domestic
production tax revenues as far as absolute figures go, and havethroughout
constituted a considerably higher percentage of the taxable base.Thus part of
the import production tax constituted additional protectionagainst imports.
It should be particularly noted that the amountof production tax levied
against a dollar of imports increased automatically wheneverthe tariff, stamp
duty or other charge against that import increased, since theproduction tax
was levied against landed cost of the import inquestion.
The problem lies in separating the protective component of the production
tax from that part offsetting taxation on domesticproduction. There is no
perfect solution to the problem, and the one adopted here is at bestonly a
first approximation. The production tax was levied only on imports of items
on List IV, and thus constituted additionalprotection against imports. The
entire amount of the production tax was treated as an additionalduty.
For commodities on Lists I, II, and Ill, only the cascading componentof
the import production tax was regarded as adding to the EER.Thus for a
commodity subject to a 20 per cent production tax levied onlanded cost
(including stamp duties, wharf charges, etc.) of twice the c.i.f. price,the
protective component of the production tax is taken as equal to 20 per cent
of the c.i.f. price, although the production tax as a per cent of c.i.f. price was
7. The lists and rates in effect in 1962 were found in I. Kizikh eta!.,Gumrük
Tarifesi, pp. 63 ff. There was little difference between these and the 1964 rates given
in Table A-6. Some production tax rates were altered in 1970.
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40 per cent. While this procedure is somewhat arbitrary, no feasible method
was found for a closer approximation to the protective component of the tax.
It probably understates the protective content of the production tax for
many imported items, and hence the resulting estimates of EERs are under.
estimates.
Stamp duty.Turkey levied a 5 per cent stamp duty on the c.i.f. value of
imports in 1963. This duty was increased to 15 per cent in 1967, and to 25
per cent in 1969. It was reduced in August 1970 to 10 per cent. Unlike the
wharf, municipality and production taxes, no cascading was involved as this
duty was levied on the price of the imports.
Guarantee deposits.Since 1953, when a 4 per cent guarantee deposit
was required with import license applications, there have been guarantee
deposit requirements of varying heights and complexity. Guarantee deposit
requirements never exceeded 10 per cent of the c.i.f. value of the goods for
which import license application was made until Thereafter, the




by list, 1958 to 1970 (deposit as per cent of value of appli-
cation)
Quota List LiberalizedList


































































Notes:a) Guarantee deposit requirements against AID-financed goods were lower
than the ratios indicated here.
b) From 1966 on, there were a few goods subject to lower rates than those
indicated.
Source:Data supplied by SF0.
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height of the guarantee deposit rates and the complexity of the guarantee
deposit schedules increased rapidly.
Table A-8 gives the rates required, under various categories, for the period
since 1958. As can be seen, guarantee deposit requirements varied between
the Quota List and the Liberalized List, as also between industrialists and
importers. By 1964 the Liberalized List had been split into two, with separate
guarantee deposit rates for each list, and additional rates applied to imports
financed by AID licenses as well.
There are two problems with estimating the tariff equivalent of the guaran-
tee deposits. First, there is the question of the interest foregone while guaran-
tee deposits were tied up. That problem is not very difficult. The second
problem, however, is considerably greater: the implicit cost of the guarantee
deposit varied not only with the foregone interest, but with the length of
time for which the guarantee deposit was held.'°Thusin 1966 the time for
which the guarantee deposit was held was generally about 5 months, whereas
by 1969 the guarantee deposit frequently was for 8 months or longer, as
delays increased in the issuance of import licenses.
10. It also varied with the ratio of the value of license applications to receipts. No way
could be found, however, to estimate variations in cost due to this factor.
Table A-9
TL cost of Si c.i.f. of imports for various guarantee deposit requirements, 1953 to 1970
posit as per cent of value of appli-
Liberalized List

































































































Sources:Table A-8 and text.290 Appendix A Calculation of EERs
It is difficult to obtain anything other than an impressionistic basis for
estimating the average length of time from the data guarantee deposits were
made until the date of importation. The time period included the period
during which the import license application was pending as well as the time
between the placing of an order after receipt of import license and the time
the commodity arrived in customs. Table A-9 gives the estimated TL costs per
dollar of c.i.f. value of imports for various guarantee deposit rates and elapsed
time between license application and receipt of imports. The estimate of the
average length of time for which guarantee deposits were held at the Central
Bank is given in the third column. Throughout the period since 1958 the
borrowing rate in Turkey fluctuated between 12 and 15 per cent. The 12 per
cent rate is used here to estimate the foregone interest (or borrowing costs) of
the guarantee deposit requirements. The rates obtained in the final columns
are those used below to compute EERs for various import categories.
Capita/goods imports.Starting in 1964, a special provision was enacted
(as part of Law 474 which revised customs duty rates) under which persons
wishing to import capital goods could in some circumstances apply for and
receive permission to pay customs duty, municipality tax, wharf tax and
production tax (but not stamp duty) in five annual installments, subject to a 5
per cent rate of interest on their outstanding obligations. Since that interest
rate was well below the borrowing rate, the provision when effective meant
that the actual cost of duties and charges on capital goods imports was lower
than their nominal value.' 1
Tobe eligible for the deferred payment of import charges the would-be
importer had to have his investment approved as being in accord with the
relevant Five Year Plan. In practice most capital goods were imported under
this provision, as the likelihood of obtaining a license for importation of
goods judged not to be in accord with the development Plans was small. No
data are available to indicate what fraction of all capital goods were imported
under this provision, but the fraction was undoubtedly very high. In the
absence of more detailed information, itis assumed that all capital goods
were imported under the deferred payment scheme.
The value of the deferred payment can be computed as the difference
between the duties presently payable (without deferment) and the present
value of the repayment schedule discounted at 15 per cent. Thus per TL 100
of duties owed on capital goods import, TL 20 would be paid at the time of
importation, TL24 one year thereafter (TL 20 principal plus 5 per cent on TL
11. The provisions are cited in Muhittin Tanci, Polat Yalçiner, and Yavuz
Içtiharli ye En Son Muhtevi GQmrOkKanunuwe Isratistik Pozisyon-
lanna BolOnmü1 GümrQk Tarife Cetveli (Ankara), 1968, pp. 109—23.
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Table A-b
Gürtan's estimates of TL cost of $1 of capital goods imports, 1953 to 1960
19531954195519561957 1958 1959 1960
Construction goods 3.583.764.254.556.167.5613.8113.94
Machinery and equipment 3.223.484,024.725.976.3011.59 11.79
Average 3.343.574.104.686.036.5512.0612.14
Source:Kenan Gürtan, untitled, mimeographed by SPO.
80), TL 23 the year later, etc. If these future payments are discounted at 15
per cent, the present value of the deferred payments is TL 84.77. Thus the
deferred payment scheme represented a 15.2 per cent reduction in duties and
charges (excep stamp tax) on imported capital goods.
At the same time as the law enabling postponement of duties payable on
capital goods was effected, a provision was also enacted which enabled the
authorities to waive duties on capital goods imports under specified
tions. No data are available on the value of capital goods imports for which
duties were entirely waived. One obtains a distinct impression from interviews
that until 1967 the provision was rarely used. Thereafter, however, the prac-
tice of waiving duties completely was believed to have become fairly general.
In estimating the subsidy against duties and taxes upon capital goods imports
in 1968, therefore, it was assumed that 75 per cent of all capital goods were
admitted duty-free (although still subject to stamp tax), while the remaining
25 per cent were entitled to the postponement of payment of duties.
The reduction in tariffs and surcharges on capital goods started in 1964.
For. the period 1953 to 1960 a set of estimates of the total TL cost of foreign
exchange for capital goods has already been prepared by Gtirtan for the SPO.
Since his estimates were based upon actual receipts by appropriate subcatego-
ries of capital goods (construction goods, and machinery and equipment sepa-
rately), it was decided to use Giirtan's estimates of the TL cost of capital
goods imports for the period prior to 1958.12
Import "exchange taxes" in the 1950's.As indicated in Chapter II, a se-
12. For other commodities, and for capital goods imports in the 1960's, the sample
indicated in Table A-S was used. GUrtan's estimates can be compared with the
sample estimates for the 1950's:
1954 1957 1959
GUrtan 3.57 6.03 12.06
Sample 4.13 5.38 12.55
These give some confidence in the method of estimating other EERs. See Note 2 to
Tables A-il to A-14.1
292 AppendixA Calculation of EERs
ries of surcharges and "treasury taxes" were successively imposed upon vari-
ous imported goods during the 1950's. In late 1953, non-cascaded taxes on a
variety of "luxury" goods were imposed, ranging from 25 to 150 per cent of
the c.i.f. price of the commodity. These surcharges remained in effect until
August 1958.13 A "Treasury Tax" of 40 per cent on foreign exchange pur-
chases went into effect on March 1, 1957, and was removed in December
On the import side, EERs were thus fairly constant between 1954 and
1957,save for negligible changes in the tariff equivalents of guarantee depos-
itsand occasional additions to the list of commodities subject to surcharges
or changes in the rates of surcharge. The rates of additional duty on selected
imports can be inferred from the "surcharge" column of estimates of import
EERs for 1954, given in Tables A-li toA-14.
Estimation of EERs.Tables A-i 1 through A-14 provide estimates
of EERs for the four categories of import goods for 1954, 1957, August
1958, 1962, 1965 and 1968. The first eight columns provide data for each
period not contained in earlier Appendix Tables, and the last six columns give
the EERs prevailing at each point in time expressed as a percentage of the
c.i.f. price at the official exchange rate. To obtain EERs in TL, the numbers
in the last six columns of Tables A-ll to A-14 can be divided by 100 and
multiplied by 2.8 prior to August 1958 and by 9 thereafter.
Thus, BTN No. 5.10 (ivory, Table A-il) carried a 10 per cent duty (from
Table A-5) in 1954 and was subject to the municipality tax. Its EER was 114, —
or1.14 times the official exchange rate of TL 2.80 per dollar, thus TL 3.10.
In 1957, ivory was subject to the 40 per cent Treasury Tax, the same tariff
rate, and a guarantee deposit requirement. Its EER was thus 1 .56 times the
official rate, or TL 437. In August 1958, ivory had virtually the same propor-
tionate EER (the guarantee deposit requirement was reduced) but at the TL 9
=$1exchange rate, that equalled TL 13.86. In 1962, ivory was eligible for
importation by industrialists under a quota, and the 40 per cent Treasury Tax
had been removed, giving it an EER of 1.14 times the exchange rate, or TL
10.26. After 1962, ivory was not on an eligible import list.
For commodities not on an eligible import list in the 19 60's EERs were
0c5
13.Data on the commodities included, and the rate of surcharge, were obtained from
Ragib Rifki OzgUrel, The Turkish Foreign Trade Regime and Decrees, List of Import
and Export Articles and Regulations, Ministry of Economy and Commerce, undated,
p. 230.
14. Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Washing-
ton), 1958, P. 293; 1959, p. 301. The 42 per cent figure appearing in the tables
reflects the 40 per cent tax plus an estimated cost of guarantee deposits equal to 2




























'(a '.0 — N N
'.0,fl N 0'.
'(a0000 — N N N
— © 00'.0 — '.0 N rf a N ——NNN
N(-ONNN NN(MNN
-a.'o '.o
0'. 0'. 00NN 0'.—





—N N N NN
NN
N N
0'. NN N— N—
00
'.0
uccessively imposed upon van-
1953, non-cascaded taxes on a
ng from 25 to 150 per cent of
arges remained in effect until
cent on foreign exchange pun-
ad was removed in December
constant between 1954 and
quivalents of guarantee depos-
Tiodities subject to surcharges
of additional duty on selected
of estimates of import
rough A-14 provide estimates
ods for 1954, 1957, August
)lumns provide data for each
and the last six columns give
ressed as a percentage of the
amEERs in IL, the numbers
can be divided by 100 and
thereafter.
led a 10 per cent duty (from
ipality tax. Its EER was 114,
.80 per dollar, thus TL 3.10.
reasury Tax, the same tariff
ER was thus 1 .56timesthe
d virtually the samepropor.
as reduced) but at the TL 9
1962, ivory was eligible for
e 40 per cent Treasury Tax
the exchange rate,or TL
Iport list.
in the 1960's EERswere
surcharge, were obtained from
me and Decrees, List of Import
omy and Commerce, undated,
nat Monetary Fund (Washing-
figure appearing in thetables







































NN N N N N N N N N
0 0000N00 iii 1111 0'.i
C0.0 0'.0 — — (-4 -, r'O(a U) (N NC". N N


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ene-i CM C-I CM
enC-.— enenencc en Ct- o ri en o0 ccen
enCMCM CM en en enC-I CM — CM
0.' C—C —




CM CM CM N CMt- C-- N N- CM CM CM CM '00.'
0
0
0 en en en
enen en
00
CM—Cr) —'0 '0 CfC —v.' C--I CO 0—00— CC
0 00 —enCt) '0 0 0 en>





L = liberalized list




Ll,L2 = Liberalized I
I,W suffixes = Indusfl
b) EERs computed as: d
wheref, is the tarifi
rate in effect, p, is
against exports, s is I
tariff equivalent of gi
The wharf and mun
where WT is the wh
1965 and 0.05 there
The relationship hol
and g are the proporl
The production tax
and +W)for
c) A blank for the
eligible import list.
d) The stamp duty col
the guarantee
goods imports, the i
capitalgoods import
e) EERs for 1958 are
= $1 exchange rate.
I) Stamp duty rates w
1965 to 1968, and
g) December 1958 EE
tracting 0.4, since
Sources:Production tax rates frt















z.I-.0Calculation of EERr 299
Notes:a) Symbols for the lists are:
Qquota list
L =liberalizedlist
P prefix =partof the category eligible for importation
P suffix =commodityeligible for importation only with Ministerial permis-
sion
AID =AID-financingonly
L1,L2 =LiberalizedLists 1 and 2 respectively
1,W suffixes =Industrialist,Importers eligible to import the commodity.
b)
wis the combined wharf and municipality tax
rate in effect, pj is the component of the production tax discriminating
agalnst exports, s is the stamp duty,m is the municipality tax, andg, is the
tariff equivalent of guarantee deposit requirements.
The wharf and municipality taxes were computed as WT + MT =a+ bti
where WT is the wharf tax and MT the municipality tax. a =0.025until
1965 and 0.05 thereafter, b =0.17875until 1965 and 0.2075 thereafter.
The relationship holds since MT1 =ctjand WT1 =h(MT,+ t + 1), where c
and g are the proportionate tax rates.
The production tax was computed as P1(1 + t1 + W) for goods on List IV
and P1(t, + W) for ListsI to III.
c) A blank for the 1960's indicates that the commodity was not on the
eligible import list.
d) The stamp duty column for the 1960's contains the stamp duty and also
the guarantee deposit requirement's ad valorem equivalent. For capital
goods imports, the implicit value of the subsidy is subtracted. Thus some
capital goods imports are reported to have a net negative stamp duty.
e) EERs for 1958 are expressed as a percentage of the c.i.f. price at the TL 9
=$1exchange rate.
f)Stamp duty rates were: 5 per cent from 1963 to 1965, 15 per cent from
1965 to 1968, and 25 per cent in 1969.
g) December 1958 EERs can be computed from August 1958 EERs by sub-
tracting 0.4, since the Treasury Tax was removed at that time.
Sources:Production tax rates from Table A-6.
Tariff rates from Table A-5.
1954 surcharge rates from op. cit. (Note 13).
1957 surcharge rates from ibid., with additions to reflect the 40 per cent
general "Treasury tax" plus a 2 per cent guarantee-deposit-requirement equiva-
lent.
List classifications for 1962, 1965 and 1968 are from Import Programs, Nos. 8
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not calculated, since they would have been meaningless. The sole exception
was capital goods imports for which special "investment goods quotas" had
been set aside, so that failure to include a capital goods item on an import list
did not necessarily imply that the product could not legally be imported.
The fact that some commodities in the sample were not legally importable
in the 1960's and therefore excluded from the calculation of the mean EER
for each commodity category imparts a bias to the sample means over time.
For example, some import-substitute commodities subject to very high tariff
rates were omitted from the 1968 import list, so that the calculated EER for
that group actually declined from its 1965 value. However (1) in the event of
a commodity not being included on a list, it was impossible to calculate any
guarantee-deposit-requirement equivalent; (2) it becomes a moot question as
to whether the import production tax rate applied; and (3) if the good had
been eligible for importation, additional taxes might have been levied. It was
decided in view of these considerations that the bias imparted by estimating
the mean rate for goods actually eligible for importation was smaller than the
bias that would have resulted from creating fictitious guarantee deposit re-
quirements and otherwise making estimates of tax rates applicable to goods
that actually could not be imported.
The average EERs for each import category, given in the last rows of
Tables A-il to A-l4, are the unweighted means of the EERs for the com-
modities in the sample. As indicated above, no satisfactory set of weights
could be found.
For the years between the dates for which data are presented, either (1)
known changes in the trade regime were of an across-the-board nature, or (2)
changes were very small or not known. Thus there is no evidence that any
component of EERs for imports changed from 1954 until 1957, except for
the production tax (for which data are not available) and for an insignificant
change in guarantee deposit requirements. Between August 1958 and 1960
the only known change was the abandonment of the 40 per cent Treasury
Tax, which reduced by 40 the EER for each commodity as measured in the
tables, so that separate calculations did not have to be made. Between 1962
and 1963 the 5 per cent stamp duty was introduced. The 1954 tariff rates
were assumed to continue in effect in 1964. From 1964 to 1965 changes
reflect the altered tariff rates and the effect of their being cascaded by other
charges. Between 1966 and 1967 the stamp duty was increased from 5 to 15
per cent. Between 1968 and 1969 the stamp duty rose from 15 to 25 per
cent. These were across-the-board changes, and are reflected in the import
EERs given in Table Vt-b. There were undoubtedly small modifications in
the system which are not reflected in those estimates. For example, the delay
in obtaining licenses increased in 1969, and therefore the implicit interest
cost of the guarantee deposit requirements increased. However, most such
phenomena were variable even
would alter the EER estimates
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Invisibles and capital transactions
Fortunately, the structure of rates on invisiblés and capital transactions
has been far simpler than that on imports. Three categories of invisibles
require separate treatment: tourism, workers' remittances ,andinterest and
dividends on foreign capital. Capital flows have essentially been kept at a
uniform rate at each point in time.
Tourism.All tourist transactions took place at the TL 2.80 =$1rate
until October 1956, when a TL 5.25 tourist rate was introduced applicable to
foreign tourists' purchases of lira in Turkey. The selling rate for Turks' for-
eign travel was changed at that time to TL 5.75 per dollar.'The rate was
unified at TL 9 =$1in August 1958. That rate remained in effect for foreign
tourists in Turkey until 1968. In 1961, however, Turks purchasing foreign
exchange for travelling abroad were taxed at the rate of 50 per cent, making
the EER TL 13.50. That rate remained in effect until August 1970. For
foreign tourists, a special buying rate of TL 12$1 was introduced in March
1968.16
Workers' remittances.Until the 1960's so few Turks worked abroad that
there were no special arrangements for their remittances. But by the mid-l 960's
Turkish workers abroad constituted an important source of foreign exchange
earnings, and special provisions were made for their remittances. In 1965 it
was decreed that Turkish workers who remitted their foreign exchange to the
Central Bank could immediately receive 3 years' interest (not compounded)
on their deposit, which could be withdrawn at any time. Thus the rate at
which workers remitted was effectively TL 11.43, since the interest rate was
9 per cent. In 1968 the workers' remittance rate was increased to TL 12, as
the interest rate was raised to 11.11 per cent. Thus the BER became 12 in'
1968 and rose only to TL 15 with the August 1970 devaluation. This was
done by continuing to prepay interest, and setting the workers' remittance
rate at TL 10 per dollar.
One other feature of workers' remittances deserves mention: returning
workers were entitled, under most conditions, to import a car whenthey
15. Annual Report on Currency Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Washing-
ton), 1957, p. 279.
16. Annual Report on Currency Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Washing-
ton), 1969, p. 470.
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1953 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80
1954 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80
1955 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80
1956• 5.25 5.75 2.80 2.80 2.80—5.752.80
1957 5.25 5.75 2.80 2.80 2.80—5.752.80
1958 9.00 9.02 9.00 .9.00 9.00 9.00
1959 9.02 9.04 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1960 9.02 13.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1961 9.02 13.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1962 9.02 13.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1963 9.02 13.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1964 9.02 13.50 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1965 9.02 13.50 11.43 9.00 9.00 9.00
1966 9.02 13.50 11.43 9.00 9.00 9.00
1967 9.02 13.50 11.43 9.00 9.00 9.00
1968 12.00 13.50 12.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
1969 12.00 13.50 12.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
Source:Annual ReportonCurrency Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Wash-
ington), various issues.
returned to Turkey.Since the car was legally resellable, either de jure or de
facto, a sizeable profit could be made. To be eligible for the privilege, the
workers (or other Turks working abroad) had to demonstrate foreign savings
in the minimum amount of $800. Thus they had to show a Central Bank
deposit of at least that amount. Since the profitability of importing a car was
generally sizeable, the EER for the first $800 of remittances considerably
exceeded the IL 11.43 or TL 12 rate. However, once minimum savings were
deposited, the incentive to deposit additional remittances hinged only upon
the prepayment of interest, and the marginal EER was considerably below
the average. For present purposes, however, it is the marginal rate, above the
minimum savings rate, which is used in estimation of the EER's.
Profit and interest remittances, and foreign capital transactions.Inter-
17. Annual Report on Currency Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Washing-
ton), 1967, p. 622. In 1968, the importation privilege was slightly restricted in that
the importer had to show he had owned the vehicle for six months.
I
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est, dividends and profit remittances, as well as capital repatriation were
blocked after World War El. A Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Invest-
ment was passed in 1951 which guaranteed that foreign investors coming
under the scope of the law would be entitled to repatriate 10 per cent of the
investment annually in the form of profits, interest, dividends or capital
repatriation. The 10 per cent ceiling was removed in 1964. Virtually all
private capital flows since 1951 have come under those provisions and hence
remittances have generally been legal.'
8Bothforeign loans and foreign in-
vestment required government approval, and once it was received, came
under the scope of the Law.
The TL 2.80 exchange rate was in effect for these transactions until
August 1958. In 1956 patents, royalties, licensing fees and capital transfers of
foreign companies not coming under the provisions of the Law for Encour-
agelnent of Foreign Investment were made subject to the TL 5.75 exchange
rate. Except for that category, however, capital transfers and remittances
have been made at the official exchange rate throughout the period under
study.TableA-I 5 summarizes the EERs for invisible and capital transac-
tions.
18. Companies earning more than 10 per cent, of course, experienced partial blockage of
their earnings. In the 1960's special categories of investment, such as tourism, were
established. Foreign companies could invest in those categories and repatriate addi-
tional sums under those circumstances.
19. One exception is the foreign oil companies which were guaranteed that they could
repatriate part of their earnings at the TL 2.80 exchange rate, which continues in
effect.
jAPPENDIX B
CALCULATION OF FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR TURKEY's
DECLINING EXPORT EARNINGS, 1954 TO 1958
There are two alternative bases on which one can decompose the changes
in a country's export earnings. First, one can form the identity:
— —P1o)X10+ —X10)
+ —F10) —X10) (Bi)
where P1 is the price of the ith export commodity, X1 is the quantity of the
ith good exported, and o,t subscripts refer to the initial and terminal periods.
The first term on the right can be identified as the part of the change in
export earnings attributable to price changes, the second term as the part
attributable to quantity changes, and the last term as the result of interaction
between price and quantity changes. A positive sign for the first two terms
suggests that prices and quantities increased.
Second, one can use "shift and share" analysis. Then,
E —V10) s10 + (s11— (B2)
where V1 is the value of exports of the ith commodity, s is the Turkish share
of world exports of the ith commodity, W1 is the value of world exports of
the ith commodity, and o,t subscripts refer to the initial and terminal periods.
In this formula, the left-hand side refers to the change in the total value of
exports. The first term on the right indicates what exports would have been if
the initial share of each commodity market had been maintained, while the
second term reflects the change in share of exports.
Neither decomposition of the change in export earnings has a sound under.
lying theory. Both formulations reflect identities, and in that sense, neither
can be given a "causal" interpretation.1 Thus in eq. (B 1), it might be that the
quantity change was positive and the price change negative simply because a
country was selling more at a lower price, and conversely. However, both
formulations are useful in exploring the proximate factors accounting for
changes in export earnings.
1. See I.David Richardson, "Constant-Market-Shares Analysis of Export Growth,"
Journal of International Economics, May 1971.
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Tables B-i to B-4givethe data and commodities which were used to
compute the terms in equations (Bl) and (B2). As can be seen, the commodi-
ties included in the computations cover over 80 per cent of Turkey's export
earnings in 1953. Although the figures are given in IL, the exchange rate used
to record exports was constant throughout the period. Dollar figures can be
obtained by dividing by 2.8.
Table B-i
Actual commodity-specific export earnings, 1953—1958 (millions of TL)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Wheat 164.3 188.3 35.0 49.7 0 7.7
Barley 34.9 6.7 15.4 25.1 0 15.8
Cereal n.e.s.24.0 10.2 3.2 4.1 6.5 n.a.
Dried fruit95.2 120.7 166.2 55.8 64.5 63.8
Oilseed cakes 23.4 25.0 29.8 30.9 20.4 15.9
Tobacco 238.7 240.5 249.2 261.9 388.8 235.9
Wool 31.4 24.4 30.8 27.0 40.8 n.a.
Cotton 220.3 146.8 128.2 73.5 116.0 62.7
Chrome 79.1 43.4 55.6 65.1 59.9 51.6
Copper 33.3 20.7 24.6 47.6 24.2 18.1
Value 944.6 826.7 738.0 640.7 721.1 518.8
All exports 1109.0 937.8 877.3 854.0 966.7 626.3
Source:See Table ff4.
Table B-2
Exports with actual prices, 1953 volume, 1953—1958 (millions of IL)
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Wheat 164.3 120.1 132.1 168.2 138.1 138.1
Barley 34.9 20.7 25.5 24.0 20.8 16.0
Cereal n.e.s.24.0 20.0 49.5 20.0 55.8 55.8
Dried fruit95.2 85.9 133.1 67.7 65.4 74.1
Oilseed cakes 23.4 109.7 95.3 27.7 25.3 16.9
Tobacco 238.7 267.4 297.6 309.0 314.8 301.1
Wool 31.4 32.3 29.8 37.1 66.7 66.9
Cotton 220.3 243.9 244.9 213.7 192.5 183.4
Chrome 79.1 81.4 67.9 67.9 67.9 67.7
Copper 33.3 31.3 35.9 43.9 29.4 25.1
Value 944.6 1012.7 1111.6 979.1 976.7 945.1
Ratio to
•actual 1.00 1.22 1.50 1.53 1.35 1.82
Source:See Table B-4.
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Table 8-3
1953 prices, 1953—1958 (millions of TL) T
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Wheat 164.3 256.5 43.2 47.7 0 9.0
Barley 34.9 11.0 20.5 35.8 0 34.5
Cereal n.e.s.24.0 12.5 1.6 5.0 2.8 —
Dried fruit95.2 133.4 119.2 78.8 93.4 81.9
Oilseed cakes 23.4 5.2 7.2 25.3 18.7 21.6
Tobacco 238.7 214.4 199.8 202.1 294.7 186.8
Wool 31.4 23.7 32.5 23.7 19.3 —
Cotton 220.3 132.7 115.4 75.8 132.7 75.6
Chrome 79.1 42.8 67.1 74.9 68.5 61.1
Copper 33.3 22.0 22.7 36.1 27.4 23.9
Total 944.6 854.2 629.2 605.2 657.5 516.6
Ratio to
actual 1.00 103.3 0.852 0.943 0.912 0.996
Source: See Table B-4.
Table B-4
Exports with constant shares, 1953—1958 (millions of TL)
1953 .1954 1955 1.956 1957 1958
Wheat 164.3 124.3 125.2 183.7 168.8 152.9
Barley 34.9 24.1 29.4 40.9 37.5 39.2
Cereals n.e.s.24.0 16.8 27.7 33.3 19.3 28.8
Dried fruit95.2 112.0 108.6 103.3 105.3 116.8
Oilseed cakes 23.4 38.4 44.8 49.0 42.6 43.1
Tobacco 238.7 240.5 247.8 267.7 336.0 357.3
Wool 31.4 28.8 29.7 31.4 38.6 26.6
Cotton 220.3 248.6 178.6 213.9 271.9 219.5
Chrome 79.1 74.8 74.8 97.4 135.2 157.9
Copper 33.3 30.8 40.0 49.0 42.0 50.4
Total 944.6 939.1 906.6 1069.6 1197.2 1192.5
Ratio to
actual 1.00 1.13 1.23 1.67 1.66 2.29
Noses:Exports of cereals n.e.s. and wool were not separately reported for 1958. 1957
figures for those commodities were used to compute totals for 1958.
Source:Values and quantities from Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, United
Nations, various issues. Unit values derived by dividing value by quantity.
Computed values as indicated in text.AppendixB Calculating Turkey's Declining Export Earnings. 1954 to 1958
Table B-2 gives the value exports would have had had the volume of each
export remained constant at its 1953 level, while unit prices assumed their
actual recorded values. In a sense, the sum over the commodities examined of
export values gives an indication of the weighted change in export prices over
• the l954-to-l958 period. If volume had retained its 1953 level for each
export commodity, Turkey's export earnings would have increased through
1955, and would have remained above their 1953 level in each year under
• examination. Thus there is no way to attribute the decline in recorded export
earnings to a deterioration in prices received by Turkey for her major exports.
The last row of Table B-2 gives the ratio of export earnings with volume
constant to actual exports. With constant export volumes, export earnings
would have been 50 per cent greater than they actually were in 1955 and
1956, and 35 per cent greater in 1957, even with no growth in the volume of
exports and actual prices.
Table B-3 gives the values exports would have had with constant (1953)
prices and the actual volume of exports. With constant prices, Turkey's ex-
ports would have declined even more than they in fact did. Actual export
earnings in every year after 1954 were greater than they would have been had
there been no changes in export prices. In an index-number sense, the weight-
ed average price received by Turkey for her exports increased from 1953 to
1958.
Table B-4 indicates the value Turkey's exports would have assumed if the
Turkish share of world exports of each commodity had remained constant.
While it may be argued that Turkey might not have been able to expand her
share of world exports without a reduction in price received, it is difficult to
accept that argument for constancy of share, especially since the shares were
computed on a value basis. Moreover, Turkey's share in international trade
for the commodities listed ranged from 3.0 per cent for dried fruit to 1.8 per
cent for copper. In none of these export groups was Turkey's share of the
market very large. It seems reasonable in a growing market to assume that a
country could maintain her share of the market without suffering terms-of-
trade losses. Had Turkey maintained her share in each of her commodity
markets, Turkish export earnings would have grown 23 per cent over the
period 1953-to-1958, contrasted with an actual decline of 43 per cent.
The decline in export earnings can now be decomposed in accordance with
(Bl) and (B2). For the commodities in the sample,
total changeshare constant change in share.
4
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Thusin a definitional sense the declinein export earnings resultedentirely
from a reduction in export volumes,which was slightly offset byan increase
in average price. Similarly, theTurkish loss in share of world marketsexceed-
ed the decline in export earnings.
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THE 1970 DEVALUATION
In August 1970 the Turkish lira was devalued dejure anddefacto. Al-
though the writing of the main chapters of this book continued into 1972,
the work was based on research completed early in 1971. At the time this
Appendix was drafted (September 1972) enough facts were available to per-
mit at least a broad description of the events leading up to and following the
1970 devaluation. No analysis undertaken only two years after the event can
be definitive, especially in view of the fact that data are far from complete,
even for 1971. The conclusions stated here then should be regarded as tenta-
tive.
An interesting aspect of the devaluation is its remarkable superficial resem-
blance to the 1958 experience. The outcome, however, has been surprisingly
different, though it nevertheless appears to substantiate much of the analysis
of earlier chapters.
The nominal devaluation was a two-thirds increase in the price of foreign
exchange, from TL 9 to TL 15 to the dollar.1 As in 1958, though, the stamp
duties and certain other surcharges upon its imports were reduced while the
exchange rate for most traditional exports was set at TL 12 per dollar. Thus
the effective devaluation was considerably less than the nominal one. Simulta-
neously with the exchange rate-alteration some domestic taxes were signifi-
cantly increased, the prices of a number of products sold by public enter-
prises were raised sharply, and foreign credits were extended to Turkey.
The effects of the devaluation upon Turkey's balance of payments and
domestic economic activity were much more immediate than those of 1958,
and contrast sharply with them. On the international payments side, export
earnings rose rapidly, workers' remittances increased beyond the most op-
timistic expectations, and despite a massive liberalization of imports Turkey's
foreign exchange reserves rose sharply, reaching $772 million at the end of
1971 contrasted with $477 million in July 1970.
Domestically the release of funds previously frozen in guarantee deposits
plus the increase in the money supply resulting from increased foreign ex-
change receipts (especially workers' remittances) led to a rapid increase in the
1. When the dollar was devalued in December 1971 the Turkish lira retained its parity
with continental European currencies and the dollar exchange rate became TL 14 per
dollar.310 Appendix C
price level, and despite some political uncertainties, to be discussed below,
real GNP increased 9.2 per cent in 1971, according to provisional estimates
by the SPO. That was the second highest real growth rate attained during the
planning years. While the 1958 devaluation was followed by price stability
and recession, with little immediate export response, the 1970 devaluation
was followed by inflation, a rapid expansion of output, and a large increase in
foreign exchange earnings from exports and other sources.
Before turning to more detailed consideration of the devaluation, the po-
litical events of 1969—1971 should be mentioned. There is again a strong
superficial resemblance to 1958 and its aftermath. Elections had been held in
October 1969, and the Justice Party under the leadership of Prime Miiiister
Demirel was returned to power, receiving 46 per cent of the popular vote,
compared to 52 per cent in the 1965 elections. Throughout 1969, 1970 and
early 1971 there was increasing political violence in Turkey, with clashes
between left and right wing extremists. Frequent encounters between stu-
dents and police took place on several university campuses, and despite ef-
forts of the government to handle the situation, violence continued. These
events were so much at the center of political discussion that the devaluation
went almost unnoticed.2 By March 1971 the Turkish military intervened and
informed the Prime Minister that he could either resign or face a military
coup.3 Demirel resigned, and a new government under Nihat Erim as Prime
Minister was formed with the approval of the Turkish military leadership.
Two Erim governments followed. The first lasted until December 1971 and
the second until May 1972, when the Prime Minister resigned. The next
government, under Ferit Melen as Prime Minister, again had military backing,
although Parliament and political parties continued to function.
The Erim and Melen governments both imposed martial law and made
strenuous, generally successful, efforts to stop the violence, with arrests and
convictions of many suspected of encouraging the students or participating in
the violence. Several changes in the administration of economic policy oc-
curred under the first Erim government, the most important effect of these
changes being that there was considerable uncertainty in the private sector as
to the new government's intentions. Specifically relating to the trade regime,
export price checks were resumed and rigorously enforced for a period of
2. The EIU has indicated that the devaluation strengthened Prime Minister Demuel
politically, although many observers of Turkish politics disagree, believing that deval-
uation was arelatively unimportant issue at that time: EIU, Op. Cit.(Note 1,
Chap. II), No. 3, September 1970, p. 2. The Prime Ministor's proposed budget had
been defeated in Parliament early in 1970, as several members of the Justice Party
defected, but a new cabinet was formed at that time. The basis upon which the EIU
formed its judgement is unclear.
3. MiddleEastern Journal. Summer1971, p. 385.
I
The 1970 Devaluation
several months, from May
there were widespread reports
price checks prior to export,
to inspect all shipments
most business uncertainty
both Erim governments made
economic reforms, little of a
that direction by the summer
Thus the years 1969—1972
and political questions occupie
preoccupation lay in factors es
ments regime or changes in it
1972, which were naturally ye
issue, because the more impor
of civilian politicians to the mU
I. The situation pre-devalu.
As seen in earlier chapter
almost continuously from 19
hardest hit, for approval of
when licenses had been
exchange became available. E
estimated that the delay in
weeks for industrialist, and
million of import licenseswi
exchange was available.That
ings.4 By June 1970 delays
reports of shortagesof imp
ducts.5 It was generally bell
tainment of the goals setfort]
Earlier recommendations
OECD and other agencies, ani
tion within Turkeyfor seve
the Prime Minister toannol
elections, but when hedid r
somewhat.6 In a sense, the I
4. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1,Chap. 11
5. Ibid., No. 2, June1970, p. 6.
6. When severaldeputies of the.
stated publicly that theyhai
Prime Minister Demirel.Appendix C
tainties, to be discussed below,
;ording to provisional estimates
growth rate attained during the
was followed by price stability
response, the 1970 devaluation
f output, and a large increase in
her sources.
ion of the devaluation, thepo-
ioned. There is again a strong
nth. Elections had been held in
Le leadership of Prime Minister
per cent of the popular vote,
s. Throughout 1969,1970 and
lence in Turkey, with clashes
encounters between stu-
sity campuses, and despite ef-
on, violence continued. These
liscussion that the devaluation
urkish military intervened and
ther resign or facea military
under Nihat Erim as Prime
Turkish military leadership.
ted until December 1971and
Minister resigned. Thenext
again had military backing,
ted to function.
posed martial law andmade
he violence, witharrests and
te students or participatingin
tion of economic policyoc.
)st important effect of these
tainty in the privatesector as
relating to the traderegime,
ly enforced fora period of
Itheneci Prime MinisterDemjrel
tics disagree, believingthat deval-
time: EIU, Op.Cit. (Note 1,
Minister's proposed budgethad
al members of the JusticeParty
The basis Upon whichthe EIU
I
The 1970 Devaluation 311
several months, from May through the summer of 1971. In May and June
there were widespread reports that goods were piled up at the docks awaiting
price checks prior to export, since the government did not have the capacity
to inspect all shipments promptly. But with the second Erim government
most business uncertainty appeared to have ended. Although Ministers of
both Erim governments made strong statements about intentions of major
economic reforms, little of a substantive nature had been accomplished in
that direction by the summer of 1972.
Thus the years 1969—1972 were a period of political change and unrest,
and political questions occupied everyone's attention. But the causes of this
preoccupation lay in factors essentially unassociated with the trade and pay-
ments regime or changes in it. Even the rapid price increases of 1971 and
1972, which were naturally very unpopular, did not become a major political
issue, because the more important basic questions regarding the relationship
of civilian politicians to the military occupied the center of the stage.
I. The situation pre-devaluation and the devaluation decision
As seen in earlier chapters, the premium on import licenses was rising
almost continuously from 1964 to 1970. Liberalized List imports were the
hardest hit, for approval of license applications was delayed. Moreover, even
when licenses had been granted, currency transfers were delayed until foreign
exchange became available. By late 1969, at the peak export season, it was
estimated that the delay in transfer even under quota allocations was 30
weeks for industrialist, and 43 weeks for importers, reflecting about $300
million of import licenses which had been issued but for which no foreign
exchange was available. That represented half of expected 1970 export earn-
• ings.4 By June 1970 delays were even longer, and there were widespread
reports of shortages of imported intermediate goods, especially steel pro-
ducts.5 It was generally believed that these shortages would prevent the at-
tainment of the goals set forth in the 1970 Annual Program.
Earlier recommendations for devaluation had been made by the IMF,
OECD and other agencies, and there had been repeated discussions of devalua-
tion within Turkey for several years. Some outside observers had expected
the Prime Minister to announce a devaluation immediately after the 1969
elections, but when he did not do so expectations of a devaluation subsided
somewhat.6 In a sense, the fact that foreign exchange shortage had continued
4. EIU, op. cit. (Note 1, Chap. II), No. 1, March 1970, P. 3.
5.Ibid., No. 2, June 1970, p. 6.
6. When several deputies of the Justice Party left the party after the 1969 elections, they
stated publicly that they had opposed an earlier devaluation proposal put forth by
Prime Minister Demirel.312 Appendix C
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for so long meant that it could continue longer. The EJUreported in June
1970 that "there is now far less support foran early devaluation," and later
termed the timing of the devaluation a "surprise."7
When the decision to devalue was made in August 1970, thesituation was
by no means as severe as that prior to August 1958, andexternal pressures
were certainly less. The role of foreign donors in influencing the decisionto
devalue is unclear. The Consortium did not meet to make its1970 pledges
until July, and sizeable credits were extended to Turkeyafter the devalua-
tion.8 One of the arguments the Prime Ministermade in defending the deci-
sion was that foreign loans were available asa result. It seems likely that the
Consortium and its members had merely helped persuadethe Prime Minister
and others of the desirability of devaluation instead of makingit a precondi-
tion of aid renewal, and that the timingwas essentially a domestic political
decision. Prime Minister Demirel appears to have beenconvinced for some
time that the lira should be devalued but had been unableto do so due to
opposition from within his own party. The industrialists in particularopposed
the move, and they were among the key supporters of the JusticeParty. The
devaluation was announced shortly after Parliament had adjourned,which
suggests that the timing may have been influenced by that fact. The factors
influencing the Prime Minister in his decisionare unclear. With heightened
emphasis on growth during the 1960's the foreign exchangeconstraint was
certainly viewed as a bottleneck to growth, and reported disruptionsof pro-
duction resulting from transfer delays and import shortagesmay have influ-
enced the Prime Minister's attitude. After 1968, the SPO hademphasized the
promotion of non-traditional exports, and export incentives had clearlymet
with some success. Devaluation was certainly consonant with theemphasis on
new exports, and was probably an important factor influencing the Prime
Minister's thinking.9
Ii The devaluation package
When the exchange rate was altered in the summer of 1970, additional
incentivesfornon-traditionalexports were simultaneouslyestablished
through changes in the rebate system, export credits and replenishment
schemes. At the same time various changes in domestic policy took place.We
7. EIU, Cit. (Note 1, Chap. II), No.2, June 1970, p. 7;andNo. 3, September 1970,
p. 6.
8. Ibid., No. 3, September 1970, p. 13.
9. Betty S. Yaler, "Economic Aspects of the Devaluation of the Turkish Liraof August
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Other invisibles and capital 9.00 15.00 66.7
Notes:a) Import EERs were estimated by taking the pre-devaluation ratio of the
EER to the old exchange rate, subtracting 0.15 and the guarantee deposit ad
valorem equivalent, and multiplying by the new exchange rate.
b) For intermediate goods imports, it was estimated that the reduction in
duties on steel products reduced the weighted EER by 10 percent.
Source:Appendix A for pre-devaluation data. Estimates for post-devaluation imports
are the author's. Other post-devaluation data from text.
consider first the nominal and effective devaluation, and then the changes in
domestic policy. Although foreign credits were received as part of the pack-
age and imports were substantially increased, those components of the overall
policy change will be reviewed later, when considering the effect of devalua-
tion.
Nominal and effective devaluation
Table C-l summarizes the changes in nominal and effective exchange rates
that took place in August 1970. There were several exchange rates implicitly
in effect prior to 1970: the commodity exchange rate (TL 9 per dollar), the
workers' remittance and tourist buying rates (TL 12 per dollar), and the
tourist selling rate (TL 13.5 per dollar), applicable to Turkish residents wish-
ing to purchase foreign exchange for foreign travel abroad. The latter rates
had been created by laws which provided subsidies and taxes outside of the
foreign trade regime. The three rates were equalized defacto at the TL 14.85
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p. 7;andivo. 3, September 1970,
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$1buying rate and TL 15 =$1selling rate.1 0
On the import side, the stamp duty was reduced from 25 to 10 per cent,
and guarantee deposit requirements were reduced by 50 per cent. The latter
measure significantly reduced the cost of imports both directly and also
because the delay in importing was reduced sharply. An import costing $ 1,
subject to 100 per cent duty, had a landed cost of TL 22.8 pre-devaluation,
and TL 35.6 post-devaluation, for a 56 per cent increase in the EER. An item
subject to a 25 per cent duty had cost IL 14.87 pre-devaluation and cost TL
21.93 post-devaluation, for a 47 per cent increase in the EER. Thus the range
of increase in individual import EERs was between 47 and 56 per cent,
except for some intermediate steel products for which duty exemptions were
granted with devaluation.1The net result, as indicated in Table C-l, was an
increasing spread in import EERs, as capital goods and intermediate goods
became slightly cheaper relative to consumer goods and to imports of goods
also domestically produced.
The TL 15 =$1exchange rate applied to all export commodities except
cotton, figs,fig cakes, hazelnuts, molasses, oilcakes, olive oil, raisins and
tobacco. Those commodities, of course, constitute the majority of Turkish
exports. The ratio of the export EER to the import EER for non-traditional
goods thus increased somewhat, and the degree of discrimination against
export was slightly reduced. An exchange rate of TL 12 =$1 was set for the
traditional commodities, but the government promised to gradually raise that
rate to parity. The stated reasons for the lower exchange rate were that those
exports were, in any event, competitive, even at the old exchange rates; and
an increase in the exchange rates to IL 15 all at once would have resulted in
unwarranted price, increases. The rate for traditional exports was increased to
TL 13 =$1in July 197l.12
The Central Bank set up a "Foreign Exchange Equalization Fund" with
the profits on the difference between its foreign exchange purchases and
sales. The Fund was to be used to finance exports, although by 1972 the
proceeds went directly to general government revenue. Ya*er estimates that
10. Delure, theworkers' remittance rate became TL 11.25 =$1,with a per cent
subsidy still in force, and the Turkish travel rate became TI 10 =$1,with a 50 per
cent tax upon it. The limit to the amount of foreign exchange that Turks could buy
was $200, increasing to $400 in 1971.
11. The products were: cast iron products, ferro-alloys, scrap iron blooms, billets, steel
bars, sheet iron in rolls, iron and steel rods and beams, high-carbon steel products
and iron ore. Ministry of Industry permission was required. See Yaler, op. cit. (Note
9),p. 22.
12. The tobacco rate had been increased in January 1971. The hazelnut rate was raised
to TL 14 per dollar in March 1972. Since the TL was revalued to TL 14 per dollar in
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for the five months when the fund was operative in 1970, revenues were TL
585 million.'3
Rebate rates and the import replenishment scheme were altered for manu.
factured exports. A two-tier system was established for export rebates, with
those firms exporting over S 1 million entitled to rebate rates higher (ranging
from 25 to 40 per cent) than those with smaller export values (up to 30 per
cent). The intent of the two-tier system was of course to encourage larger
export volumes and to foster consolidation of small exporting firms.''The
new rebate rates were somewhat lower than the old, although the highest
export EER (IL 21 =$1)was increased. The stated intention was "to lighten
the burden on the budget."The new import replenishment scheme allowed
exporters 25 per cent of expected export earnings for importing goods need-
ed in production.
The provisions for export credit and for interest rates payable by exporters
were also altered. Not only was the Foreign Exchange Equalization Fund
established, but 50 per cent of guarantee deposits and the interest earned on
them were set aside for export credits. Interest rates for exporters were
reduced, but there are a number of reasons for questioning the likely effec-
tiveness of the scheme.' 6
Domesticpolicy changes
Several changes in domestic policies accompanied the changes in EERs.
Some were passed by Parliament prior to devaluation and others were
taken with devaluation. They included: changes in tax rates and imposition of
new taxes, some changes in domestic price policies, and alteration in the
general structure of interest rates. Some of the changes were very detailed and
had little short-run impact. In other cases, subsequent economic policies
eroded or offset the effects of the initial measures. Thus a brief description of
the initial changes will suffice.
Taxes.In addition to changes in the stamp tax, higher production taxes
were imposed on petroleum products and stocks, and taxes upon new con-
struction were levied. A variety of miscellaneous new taxes were imposed: on
the purchase of vehicles, on capital gains from real estate, and on sales of
certain service and luxury goods (furs, TV, hotels, restaurants, etc.). Produc-
13. Yater, op. cit. (Note 9), p. 24.
14. No data are available to this author on the actual rebates given or rates applicable to
individual export commodities since devaluation.
15. Quoted in Yater, op.cit.(Note 9), p. 22.
16. The system of export credits and subsidized interest rates is extremely complex, and
need not be dealt with in detail. See ibid.foranalysis of it.316 AppendixC The 1970 Devaluation
tion tax rates were altered and, importantly, assembly industry production
became subject to the production tax. A variety of other taxes (legal fees,
documents, etc.) were likewise increased.
Data are not available to evaluate accurately the aggregate importance of
the tax changes. Consolidated budget revenues from the 1971 budget are
estimated to have increased from TL 14.4 to TL 18.5 billion. Of that in-
crease, TL 2 billion, or half, came from import revenues and an additional TL
800 million came from the petroleum production tax.'In view of the
Turkish inflation of 1971, it would appear that other tax changes were rela-
tively small in their aggregate impact, although many Turks believe that the
tax on new construction depressed building starts.
Price policy.Government pronouncements following devaluation made
it clear that the danger of inflation was recognized and that the government
would adopt strong measures to combat it. The Prime Minister made strong
statements that the prices of SEE products would not be increased, and that
private sector firms unduly raising prices would be subject to various sanc-
tions, including loss of incentives (exemption from duties on capital goods
imports, investment priority status, and the like), "restrictions in their ac-
tivities within the framework of the Foreign Trade Regime," and even impris-
onment.' 8
Despitethese statements of intent, actual government policy was less than
determined both in August 1970 and afterwards. Several price increases were
announced in August 1970. They included sugar, fertilizers, and agricultural
support prices for wheat (6.3 per cent), hazelnuts (13.3 per cent), raisins (4.3
per cent), figs (17.5 per cent), cotton (18.5 per cent), and olive oil (23.8 per
cent). In May 1971 the prices of a wide variety of SEE products were in-
creased sharply. As will be seen below, all these increases combined with
government fiscal policy and a favorable harvest in 1971 to produce sizeable
inflationary pressure in the eighteen months following devaluation.
Interest rate and credit policy.One of the steps taken with devaluation
was a series of measures to increase the availability of credit to exporters and
to reduce the interest rate paid by exporters. Those measures were part of a
general overhaul of interest rates put into effect at that time. It resulted in a
complex structure of twenty-eight different types of subsidies payable to
banks for extending various categories of credit. At the time of writing, there
are no data available with which the effectiveness of the scheme can be
17. Data from budget figures.
[8. Speech of Prime Minister Demirel, quoted by Ya1er, op. cit. (Note 9), p. 19.
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III. The effects of the devaluation
It is far too early to assess the overall impact of the devaluation package.
Early results suggest that the devaluation was "successful" in improving the
balance of payments, generating increased export earnings and liberalizing the
import regime. It was less successful in terms of domestic price stability,
although a large part of the resulting inflation originated from factors not
necessarily associated with devaluation. We consider first the balance-of-
payments performance, and thereafter evaluate the effects on the domestic
economy.
Balance-of-payments performance
Table C.2 gives Turkey's balance of payments for the years 1969 to 1971.
Exports by commodities are given in the top part of the Table. Exports rose
from $537 million in 1969 to $677 million in 1971, for a 26 per cent increase
in two years. That was well above expectations: the 1971 Annual Program
projected 1971 exports at $640 million. The bulk of the increase was from
1970 to 1971, with cotton exports accounting for $51 million out of the $59
million increase between 1969 and 1970. The post-devaluation increases were
in exports of industrial products ($36 million), cotton ($20 million), other
crop exports ($ 18 million, of which $12 million was in fresh fuits and vege-
tables) and livestock products ($11 million). Hazelnuts, tobacco and mineral
exports appear to have been relatively unaffected. As mentioned above, the
first Erim government reinstituted export price checks for several months in
the summer of 1971. The 1971 export performance is all the more remark-
able in light of the uncertainties engendered by that episode.2°
Consistent with the findings of Chapter VII, increases in the export EER
appear to have had their greatest initial impact on non-traditional exports.
The year 1971 saw an exceptionally good harvest, so that part of the increase
must be attributed to good weather. But the response of industrial exports
cannot be attributed to weather, and tends to substantiate earlier conclusions
about the potential for new exports and their responsiveness to the exchange
rate.2 1
19.For a full analysis of the changes, see ibid, pp. 5 ff.
20. One of the motives for price checks was evidently the fear that there would be
overinvoicing of exports eligible for high rebate rates.
21. In July 1972, SPO officials indicated that 1972 exports were running about $120
million ahead of 1971 exports.
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Table C.2
Turkey'sbalance of payments, 1969 to 1971(millions of U.S. dollars).
1969 1970 1971
Exports fob.
Cotton 114 173 193
Tobacco 81 78 86
Hazelnuts 108 87 84
Other crops exports 59 62 80
Livestock 24 29 38
Industrial products 135 139 175
Minerals 17 20 21
Total exports 537 588 677
I,nports c. i.f
Investment goods —362 —439 —533
Intermediate goods —403 —467 —590
Consumption goods —36 —42 —48
Total imports —801 -.948 —1171
Invisibles
Debt interest payments —44 —47
Tourism and travel —5 4 21
Workers' remittances 141 273 471
Other (including offshore) —48 —41 —60
Net current account —220 —171 —109
Capital account
Debt payment —108 —158 —91
Private foreign capital 24 58 45
Projects credits 174 179 210
Consortium credits 106 217 89
Other (including SDRs) 61 135 95
Reserve movements 6 —236 —346
Errors and omissions —37 —24 107
Notes:For imports by use categories, SIS gave monthly figures for 1971 and individ-
ual averages for pre.devaluation and post-devaluation periods for 1970. Simple
averages of the figures were used to obtain the annual percentages.
Sources:Balance of payments components: Yaler, op. cit. (Note 9), p. 69. Exports by
commodities: Ibid., p. 71. Imports by use: the percentage distribution given in
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics II, 1972, SIS were multiplied by total imports.
Invisible earnings.Although export earnings increased markedly, the big
shift in Turkey's foreign exchange earnings originated in invisibles, especially
workers' remittances. As Table C-2 shows, workers' remittances rose from
$141 million in 1969 to $471 million in 1971. Part of the phenomenon was
I'Appendix C
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the result of workers switching their foreign exchange transactions from un-
official channels to official ones, as the black market all but disappeared after
devaluation. The government implemented additional measures designed to
induce workers to deposit their savings with Turkish banks (in long-term
convertible accounts paying 9 per cent) rather than abroad, and also an-
nounced that Turks would not be questioned about the source of foreign
exchange when it was deposited at local banks. Some of the increase in
workers' remittances therefore reflected the counterspeculative flows, and
thus undoubtedly represents a once-and-for-all phenomenon as workers
moved past savings back to Turkey and others transferred funds to Turkey.
Part, however, represents an increased flow, as funds move through official
channels which formerly would have been deposited abroad.
Other invisible transactions showed much smaller changes. Tourism and
travel changed from a small debit to a small credit item, which may again
have reflected a move away from the black market. Debt-servicing items were
not significantly affected.
Import liberalization.Imports rose from $801 million in 1969 to
$1,171 million in 1971, for a 46 per cent increase over two years. Comparing
the import data in Table C-2 with the program figures for 1970 (Table VI-2),
imports of both intermediate goods and investment goods, particularly the
latter, exceeded the Plan. In 1971 imports of intermediate goods rose to $590
million, and imports of investment goods also continued to increase rapidly.
Thus imports represented 10.2 per cent of estimated GNP in 1971, con-
trasted with 6.2 per cent in 1969,2 2 and the absorption of purchasing power
through the combined effects of higher import EERs and the increased real
flow of imports was sizeable. As will be seen below, there is evidence of a
slowdown in the level of economic activity in 1971, but in view of the rapid
increase in imports, it was remarkably slight.
There is as yet insufficient evidence with which to evaluate the effects of
import liberalization. There were frequent stories in 1971 of businessmen
who had applied for import licenses well in excess of what they would in fact
use, and of their discomfiture when granted the full amount applied for. The
penalty of course was that either licenses had to be used or part of guarantee
deposits forfeited. Most observers agreed that the influx of imports had virtu-
ally halted black market transactions and had increased competitive pressures
for many Turkish producers. The long-run effects remain to be seen.
22. Exports represented 5.2 per cent of GNP in 1971 contrasted with 4.1 per cent in
1969. The TL values of imports were IL 17.7 billion in 1971 and TL 7.75 billion in
1969. Monthly Bulletin, Central Bank, March 1972.
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Capital flows.The combined effects of increased workers' remittances
and export earnings reduced Turkey's current account deficit from $220
million in 1969 to $109 million in 1971, despite the increased flow of im-
ports. On capital account, private foreign capital inflows increased somewhat
and foreign aid (project and consortium credits) rose substantially, from $280
million in 1969 to $396 million in 1970, returning to $299 million in 1971.
There was also a large positive errors-and-omissions item of $ 107 million in
1971, probably reflecting a reverse speculative flow.
The net result was a huge increase in Turkey's reserves, $236 million in
1970 and $346 million in 1971. Thus the swing in the balance of payments
following devaluation was large by any standard, and Turkey's reserves were
more than comfortable early in 1972.
In contrast to the 1958 devaluation, therefore, the 1970 devaluation re-
sulted in a sharp and immediate improvement in the balance of payments.
Part of the difference originated from the response of workers' remittances,
and part can be attributed to the good harvest of 1971. But the export
response was considerably greater than post-1958 and cannot be attributed
entirely to these factors.
There are too many unknowns to evaluate whether foreign exchange earn-
ings will continue to increase rapidly. One uncertainty is the rate of domestic
inflation, to be discussed below. Another is the orientation of the Third Five
Year Plan, which is being formulated at the time of this writing. Rapid
increases in investment and orientation toward development of still more
import-substitution industries (especially heavy industry) could offset much
of the new incentive for exports created by the devaluation. On the other
hand, if further moves in the direction of equalizing incentives are taken as
imports are allowed to increase, the prospects for future growth in foreign
exchange earnings would be much brighter.
The domestic economy
The aftermath of the 1958 devaluation was one of generally disappointing
balance-of.payments performance but attainment of the domestic goal of
price stability. The short-term results of the 1970 devaluation were a greatly
improved balance of payments but frustration of the domestic goal of price
stability.
Inflation.Two exogenous factors contributed to the inflation. First, a
new Personnel Law, passed in 1970, granted large salary increases to civil
servants. The result was a 78 per cent increase in current government expen-
ditures between the first half of 1970 and the first half of 1971,85 per cent
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Table C-3
Central bank assets, money supply, and price level 1968 to 1971
1968 1969 1970 1971
Central Bank assets (millions of TL)
Foreignexchange 278 1,153 4,301 8,772
Credits 15,961 18,835 20,483 22,191
Other assets 2,228 3,681 7,789 7,862
TOTAL 18,467 23,669 32,573 38,825
Money supply (millions of IL)
Currency 8,237 9.081 11,850 13,917
Bankdeposits 17,731 21,046 23,418 29,670
TOTAL 25,968 30,127 35,268 43,587
Price level
Wholesale (1963 =100) 129 137 146 169
Note: Gold is included with other Central Bank assets.
Sources:Central Bank assets from Monthly Bulletin, Central Bank, Jan.—March, 1972;
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, SIS, II -1972; and Yaler, op. cit. (Note 9), p.43.
Money supply from Monthly Bulletin, Central Bank, Jan.—March, 1972. Price
level: Ministry of Commerce.
of which are for salaries. To meet its increased salary obligations the govern-
ment resorted to borrowing from the Central Bank. Second, the excellent
harvest of 1971, combined with increased support prices for major agricul-
tural commodities, resulted in a large increase in Central Bank credit to
TMO.23
Partial offsets were the deflationary effects of increased imports and addi-
tional revenues resulting from higher customs duty receipts and profits from
the purchase of foreign exchange at the rate of TL 12 =$1and sales at TL 15
=$1, at least for the first year after the devaluation. However, Central Bank
foreign exchange reserves increased sharply, as seen above, and much of the
increase was directly monetized. This was especially true of workers' remit-
tances. Table C-3 gives the relevant data.
As can be seen, Central Bank credits expanded rapidly between 1968 and
the election year of 1969, but their increase after that date was about 8 per
cent annually. However, foreign exchange reserves rose sharply, especially
between 1970 and 1971, when TL 4,471 million of the increase in Central
Bank assets of TL 6,252 million was the change in reserves. This was reflected
in an increase in the money supply of 23.5 per cent during 1971.
The natural result was a rapid rise in the inflation rate. The increase for
1971 as a whole was 15.7 per cent according to the Ministry of Commerce
23. The manner in which large crops can lead to inflation was spelled out in Chapter II.322 AppendixC The l97ODei'aluation
wholesale price index. Monthly figures show even sharper movements. The
wholesale price index stood at 139 in July 1970, 150 in December 1970, 164
in June 1971, and 185 in December 1971. Thus from December to December
prices rose 23 per cent.
There was some indication in the summer of 1972 that the rate of infla-
tion was beginning to decelerate, but it had by no means subsided to pre-
devaluation levels. Several factors should be noted. The sharp increase in
Central Bank credits between 1968 an 1969 would have been reflected in
quickened inflation in 1970—1971 in any event (see Fry's results reported in
Chapter II). Also, the cumulative increase in the price level from July 1970 to
December 1971 was 33 per cent, just over half the effective devaluation.
Since Turkey would have experienced some inflation even without devalua-
tion, it would appear that the increase in prices associated with devaluation in
the subsequent eighteen months was less than one third the effective devalua-
tion. Even then, stronger actions to offset the inflow of reserves might have
reduced the initial impact on the price level.
The real danger to the success of the devaluation comes not from the
inflation experienced in the first eighteen months but from the danger that
continued inflation (at a more rapid rate than would otherwise have been the
case) will erode the increasein the PLD-EERs that devaluation accom-
plished. The timing of the Personnel Law and of the raising of price supports
were therefore unfortunate in that regard. Whether the government can slow
down inflation is a critical question; and at the time of writing the outcome is
still in doubt.
Effects on the level of economic activity.Despite the high rate of
growth of GNP in 1971 there is some evidence suggesting that a mild, short-
lived recession followed the devaluation. As with the price level, however, an
important exogenous factor contributed. That was the uncertainty associated
with the political violence and formation of the Erim government.
One indicator is the ratio of currency to bank deposits, which rose sharply
from 43 per cent in 1969 to 51 per cent in 1970 and reached a peak of 77 per
cent in March 1971 (see Table C-3), and thereafter declined to more normal
levels. Part of the increase may have reflected the release of previously frozen
guarantee deposits, although delays in depositing the unfrozen funds would
still be explicable only by political uncertainties.
As with the aftermath of the 1958 devaluation, the construction sector
appears to have been most adversely affected. According to the national
income accounts, real construction grew at 8 per cent in 1969, 5.5 per cent in
1970, and 1.1 per cent in 1971.24 The fact that taxes were imposed upon
24. SPO estimates at 1965 prices.
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newconstruction at the time of devaluation undoubtedly contributed to the
decline in the rate of expansion. The result was a shift in the composition of
investment, away from construction and toward plant and equipment, as real
investment rose an estimated 4.5 per cent in 1971.
Two other indicators also suggest recession in the private sector. Real
private fixed capital investment is estimated to have declined 0.9 per cent in
1971, although investment in inventory rose 30 per cent over 1970 levels.
The second was a reduced demand for bank credit from the private sector. Of
an increase in deposits of commercial banks with the Central Bank of TL 3.3
billion in 1971, TL 0.5 billion were above legal reserve requirements, and
there was a sharp shift away from private sector credits.2 5
Despite these factors, industrial output rose 8.7 per cent in 1971, although
expansion had been only 2.5 per cent in 1970.26 The fact of an excellent
harvest in 1971 undoubtedly contributed purchasing power to the agricul.
tural sector, which may have offset whatever decreases in demand originated
from the construction sector. Thus to the extent that there was recession, it
was extremely mild and took the form of a lower-than-average industrial
growth rate rather than reductions in the level of economic activity.
An interesting question is what would have happened to the level of eco-
nomic activity in the absence of the government's expansionist expenditure
policies in 1970 and 1971. The existence of strong inflationary pressure
suggests that government policies may have been too expansionist. On the
other hand, the evidence indicates some slowing down in demand from the
private sector. If that was so, government expenditure policies were necessary
to prevent even greater recessionary forces from operating. Final judgment
may well rest on whether the rapid price increases of 1970—1971 can be
brought under control fairly quickly. If they can, the expansionist policies of
the government may have buffered the economy from recession while enab-
ling resource reallocation. If they cannot, the cost in terms of a more rapid
rate of inflation in the long run way prove to be higher than Turkish policy-
makers are willing to accept.
IV. Conclusions
It is too soon to pass judgment on the 1970 devaluation. The contrasts
with the 1958 devaluation however are of interest. And there are also some
25. op. cit. (Note 9), pp. 38 ff.
26. The slow rate of expansion in 1970 may have resulted from import shortages, al-
though further data are needed before a definitive analysis can be made. Certainly
the slow rate of growth for the year cannot be attributed to the effects of an August
devaluation.
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pertinent similarities. Similarities include the Personnel Law with its impact
on current government expenditures; the change of governments and political
uncertainty following each devaluation; resort to a lower EER for traditional
exports; and a backlog of import licenses awaiting foreign exchange at the
time of each devaluation.
The contrasts are more pronounced. First, the structure of the Turkish
economy was markedly altered between 1958 and 1970, and government
policies pre-devaluation were noncomparable. Second, the 1958 devaluation
was aimed as much at altering domestic policy and eliminating inflation as it
was at improving the balance of payments, if only because the former was a
necessary condition for the latter. In 1970 the devaluation did not signal
major changes in domestic policies and was aimed at improving the balance of
payments. Third, the 1958 Stabilization Program virtually eliminated infla-
tion, whereas the 1970 devaluation intensified it. Inflationary pressure result-
ed primarily from success in increasing foreign exchange reserves which in-
creased the money supply. Finally, the 1970 devaluation resulted in an imme-
diate improvement in the balance of payments, whereas the 1958 improve-
ment was far smaller. Judged by its effect on the balance of payments in the
first eighteen months, the 1970 devaluation was the more successful of the
two.
Construction activity appears to have been retarded after both devalua-
tions, and investment composition shifted toward plant and equipment. Pri-
vate sector investment appears to have declined after each devaluation al-
though manufacturing output has increased. These similar responses tend to
confirm the analysis of earlier chapters that import shortages and currency
overvaluation may lead to distortions of investment toward construction ac-
tivity when insufficient imports are available. In addition, business activity
becomes increasingly oriented toward short-term gains achievable through
obtaining import licenses. When devaluation occurs these tendencies are re-
versed. Since construction investment has a higher fraction of domestic value-
added than plant and machinery investment, the initial response is a slow-
down in the rate of economic activity.
The Turkish economy remains heavily oriented towards import-substitu-
tion, despite the devaluation of 1970. Incentives for non-traditional exports
were increased, but are still markedly less than incentives for import-substi-
tuting production. The prohibited list remains a highly protective instrument
for encouraging new import-substituting industries, and to date there is no
mechanism for gradual reduction of protection as industries become estab-
lished.
Turkey's very ample foreign exchange reserves, combined with the oppor-
tunities for liberalization associated with her prospective membership in the
Common Market, offer an opportunity to move gradually toward a more
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APPENDIX D-l
DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS USED IN THE PROJECT
Exchange rates
1. Nominal Exchange Rate: The official parity for a transaction. For coun-
tries maintaining a single exchange rate registered with the International
Monetary Fund, the nominal exchange rate is the registered rate.
2. Effective Exchange Rate The numberof units of local currency
actually paid or received br a one-dollar international transaction. Sur-
charges, tariffs, the implicit interest foregone on guarantee deposits, and any
other charges against purchases of goods and services abroad are included, as
are rebates, the value of import replenishment rights, and other incentives to
earn foreign exchange for sales of goods and services abroad.
3. Price-Level-Deflated (PLD) Nominal Exchange Rates: The nominal ex-
change rate deflated in relation to some base period by the price level index
of the country.
4. Price-Level-Deflated EER (PLD—EER): The EER deflated by the price
level index of the country in question.
5. Purchasing-Power-Parity Adjusted Exchange Rates: The relevant (nomi.
nal or effective) exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of the foreign price
level to the domestic price level.
Devaluation
1. Gross Devaluation: The change in the parity registered with the IMF
(or, synonymously in most cases, de jure devaluation).
2. Net Devaluation: The weighted average of changes in EERs by classes of
transactions (or, synonymously in most cases, de facto devaluation).
3. Real Gross Devaluation: The gross devaluation adjusted for the increase
in the domestic price level over the relevant period.
4. Real Net Devaluation: The net devaluation similarly adjusted.
Protection concepts
I. Explicit Tariff: The amount of tariff charged against the import of a
good as a per cent of the import price (in local currency at the nominal
exchange rate) of the good.
2. Implicit Tariff (or, synonymously, tariff equivalent): The ratio of the326 Appendix D1
Definition of Concepts Used in the
domestic price (net of normal distribution costs) minus the c.i.f. import price
to the c.i.f. import price in local currency.
3. Premium: The windfall profit accruing to the recipient of an import
license per dollar of imports. It is the difference between the domestic selling
price (net of normal distribution costs) and the landed cost of the item
(including tariffs and other charges). The premium is thus the difference
between the implicit and the explicit tariff (including other charges) multi-
plied by the nominal exchange rate.
4. Nominal Tariff: The tariff —eitherexplicit or implicit as specified —ona
commodity.
5. Effective Tariff or Effective Rate of Protection (ERP): The explicit or
implicit tariff on value-added as distinct from the nominal tariff on a com-
modity.
6. Domestic Resource Costs(DCR):The value of domestic resources (eval-
uated) at "shadow" or opportunity cost prices) employed in earning or saving
a dollar of foreign exchange (in the value-added sense) when producing domes-
tic goods.
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Dsts) minus the c.i.f. import price
APPENDIX D-2
g to the recipient of an import
between the domestic selling DELINEATION OF PHASES USED IN TRACING
bd the landed cost of the item
premium is thus the difference THE EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES
'(including other charges)multi-
icit or implicit as specified —ona To achieve comparability of analysis among different countries, each
author of a country-study was asked to identify the chronological develop- otection (ERP): The explicit or
ment of hiscountry'spayments regime through the following Phases. There rn the nominal tariff on a corn- was no presumption that a country would necessarily pass through all the
Phases in chronological sequence. Detailed description of the Phases will be
due of domestic resources (eval- found in Bhagwati and Krueger, Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Devel-
)employedin earning or saving
sense) when producing domes. opment: Experience and Analysis.
Phase I: During this period, quantitative restrictions on international trans-
actions are imposed and then intensified. They generally are initiated in re-
sponse to an unsustainable payments deficit and then, for a period, are inten-
sified. During the period when reliance upon quantitative restrictions as a
means of controlling the balance of payments is increasing, the country is said
to be in Phase I.
Phase II: During this Phase, quantitative restrictions are still intense, but
various price measures are taken to offset some of the undesired results of the
system. Heightened tariffs, surcharges on imports, rebates for exports, special
tourist exchange rates, and other price interventions are used in this Phase,
but primary reliance is placed on quantitative restrictions.
Phase III: This Phase is characterized by an attempt to systematize the
changes which take place during Phase II. It generally starts with a formal
exchange-rate change and may be accompanied by removal of some of the
surcharges, etc., imposed during Phase II and by reduced reliance upon quan-
titative restrictions. Phase III may be little more than a tidying-up operation
(in which case the likelihood is that the country will re-enter Phase II), or it
may signal the beginning of the removal of reliance upon quantitative restric-
tions.
Phase IV: If the changes in Phase III result in adjustments within the coun-
try so that liberalization can continue, the country is said to enter Phase IV.
The necessary adjustments generally include increased foreign exchange earn-
ings and gradual relaxation of quantitative restrictions. The latter relaxation
may take the form of changes in the nature of quantitative restrictions or of
increased foreign exchange allocations, and thus reduced premia, under the
same administrative system.I
328 AppendixD-2 Definitionof Concepts Used in the
Phase V: This is a period during which an exchange regime is fully liberal-
ized. There is full convertibility on current account, and quantitative restric-
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exchangeregime is fully liberal-
and quantitative restric-
ing the ex-ante balance of pay- APPENDIX D-3
LIST OF IMPORTANT TURKISH NAMES AND
ABBREVIATIONS
Atatürk The leader of Turkey's independence movement and of
the country until his death in 1938.
Demirel Prime Minister of Turkey from 1965 to 1971.
Democratic PartyThe party led by Prime Minister Menderes, in power in
the 1950's. It was dissolved after the May 1960 Revolu-
tion.
Erekli Steel A steel mill built in the 1960's at Eregli with the help of
U.S. aid.
EBK Et ye Balik Kurumu. The state enterprise for meat and
fish.
Etatism The name given to the economic philosophy adopted
during the 1930's, under which State Economic Enter-
prises and private sector firms would both participate in
Turkey's economic development.
FFYP The First Five Year Plan, 1963—1967.
Justice Party A party formed in the 1960's which attained power in
the elections of 1965. It is somewhat more free-enter-
priseoriented than the RPP, itslargest competitor
during the 1960's.
One one-hundredth of a Turkish Lira.
Menderes Prime Minister of Turkey from 1950 to the May 1960
Revolution and leader of the Democratic Party.
NUC National Unity Committee. The group which governed
the country after the May 1960 Revolution until the
elections in the fall of 1961.
RPP Republican Peoples' Party. The major opposition party
in Turkey from 1950 to 1961 and from 1965 to the
present.Its most famous leader, and Prime Minister
during the early 1960's, was Ismet Inönü. It is the party
founded by AtatUrk.
SEE State Economic Enterprise, a government-owned firm
engaged in economic activity.





State Institute of Statistics (Deviet Istatistik EnstitUsu).
State Planning Organization (Deviet Planlama
Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (Soil Products Office).
Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, a semi-
official body to which all private sector firms with ten or
more employees belong. The Union bore a major respon-
sibility for allocating imports among private sector firms,
and has represented the interests of the private sector in
government deliberations on many subjects.
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